канон национальной историографии
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guyz30The Canon: Basic Parameters
Let us attempt to establish the basic parameters of the canonical scheme
now practiced in normative historiography with greater or lesser variations
and even occasional “deviations.” The preceding reflections may
lend themselves to a somewhat simplified notion of a canon supposedly
formulated and propagated only by ideologically committed historians
who carry out service functions for ideological structures, or by professionals
inspired by enthusiasm for patriotic enlightenment, or by those
who consider Ukrainian history a convenient and necessary didactic
instrument for implanting Ukrainian patriotism into mass consciousness.
The reality is of course far more complex. Those who pursue their
research in the framework of normative historiography include fairly
high-quality professionals who are aware of other approaches and value
them but nevertheless prefer to adhere to traditional schemas and seek
ways of adapting them to contemporary requirements or defend their
intellectual capacity (for example, the Lviv historians Yaroslav Dashkevych
and Yaroslav Isaievych).
Naturally, such attitudes may be provoked by distaste for intellectual
fashion, especially by reaction to the import of previously unknown,
misinterpreted and quite often misspelled terminology and methodology,
or by simple lack of interest, or, indeed, by personal preference. In
any case, it is unfair to depict representatives of normative historiography
as some kind of monolithic legion of professional obscurantism or
methodological backwardness.
As noted earlier, the fundamental features of the historiographic canon
took shape at the turn of the twentieth century on the basis of mixed traditions
of romanticism (the identification of the people as the basic subject
of national history per se) and positivism as the basic approach to
the subject. In historiographic jargon that line was given the name of
“populist” historiography or “the Hrushevsky school.” During the early
decades of the twentieth century this canon was supplemented in some
measure by the so-called statist school (whose founder is traditionally
considered to be Viacheslav Lypynsky), which stressed the role of elites
“Natonalized” History 15
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and the state factor in nation formation. In diaspora historiography these
two orientations were cultivated as distinct schools, although there was
no difference between them in principle—both promoted the realization
of the “national project” and did not so much contradict as supplement
each other within the framework of the national-patriotic canon. The
return to “authentic” history at the turn of the 1990s led to the reincarnation
of this approach and gave it active academic currency.
Let us attempt to define the basic features of this canon. Above all, it
is basically teleological. The goal—the formation of a nation and a
state—is identified with the cause, generating the idea that the Ukrainian
nation and state arose naturally and were “objectively determined”
or programmed. They arose because they were supposed to arise. This
kind of causality manifests itself in clear-cut cognitive schemas, deviation
from which is regarded as lack of patriotism at worst and methodological
imperfection at best. It is worth noting that the tendency to construct
linear teleological schemes within the framework of the national
narrative is determined not only by ideological demand and the legitimization
syndrome, or by a simple return to the cognitive and descriptive
schemas of the turn of the twentieth century, but also by the wholly
painless adaptation of ways of thinking and writing implanted in the
consciousness of historians during the Soviet period. The transition
from the teleology of socio-economic formations and class struggle to
the teleology of the eternal existence of the nation and its struggle for
that existence passed almost unnoticed and is unlikely to have become
an object of reflection for the great majority of those who are “restoring
historical justice.”
This kind of teleology is impossible without essentialism: the Ukrainian
nation (in its various hypostases) is defined as a constantly (actually
or potentially) present community that needs only to be properly identified
and characterized with the aid of a well-chosen set of cognitive instru -
ments. As a result, categories of ideological or political practice very
easily take on scholarly analytical status, and the distinction between
scholarship and ideology disappears, which does not, in principle, disturb
the supporters and adepts of nationalized history. The outstanding example
here is the category of “national renaissance,” which has fulfilled
various ideological functions and continues to do so, even as it remains
quite legitimately on the list of scholarly concepts. In this case, a rational
explanation of “national renaissance” is conceivable and possible,
but it inevitably remains secondary and subordinate to the metaphor—
essentially irrational but extraordinarily potent—that asserts the exis-
16 Georgiy Kasianov
Ukrajna I:Ideologies minta 10/21/08 5:07 PM Page 16
tence and presence of a transcendent, timeless “nation.” In periods of
statelessness this is a “nation in itself,” a Sleeping Beauty; when handsome
princes arrive in the persons of bearded historians, philologists,
ethnographers and others, it awakens and becomes a nation “for itself”;
a felicitous period of statehood begins, and the vexatious need to assert
its right of existence disappears. Such a worldview contains an element
of the given. It is not the nation’s existence that requires explanation but
cases in which the nation gives no sign of life (in general, or in certain
historical periods). This explanation is intended mainly for oneself. There
are also explanations for others—arguments deployed in the struggle
with those who question the eternal presence of a given nation (even as
a project) in history and in the present.
There is an element of overpowering intellectual inertia in all this.
The repetition of a scenario duplicated dozens, hundreds, and thousands
of times in political writings, textbooks, scholarly works, and fiction
creates an aura of self-evidence and naturalness in spite of its obvious
banality.
Another basic feature of the canon of nationalized history is its ethnocentricity,
which readily turns into egocentricity. Since its principal
subject is the Ukrainian people, and, according to the corresponding
intellectual tradition, the “Ukrainian people” is a particular ethnos or
group of culturally, linguistically and even genetically related ethnoses
and subethnoses, it is clear that national history is concerned above all
with the transformation of this people and ethnos into a nation. A characteristic
feature in this regard is the identification of the concept of the
“Ukrainian people” with that of the “Ukrainian nation.”
This gives rise to another important feature of nationalized history: its
claim to ethnic exclusivity. The history of Ukraine is the history of ethnic
Ukrainians. A number of approaches are possible here. The coarsest
of them consists in ignoring the presence of other ethnoses or nations in
what was actually a common space and time; the denial of a whole system
of mutual cultural, psychological, political, and economic influences;
and the refusal of the right of other nations to exist “inside” Ukrainian
nationalized history. A variant of this approach recognizes the presence
of other peoples (ethnoses) in nationalized history as a background
required to reinforce and structure the history of one’s own nation.
Mention must also be made of claims to the particularly tragic and sacrificial
character of Ukrainian history—an extreme and rather superficial
variant of exclusivity.
“Natonalized” History 17
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Finally, one of the most prominent elements of the canon is the linearity
and absolutization of the historical continuity of the “ethnospeople-
nation.” The outstanding example is the well-known “metamorphosis”
of Ukrainian history as it makes its way through various schemes
of periodization. Although this construction is well known, it is worth
considering once again in order to make the argument complete: first
we have the presence of autochthonous tribes since prehistoric times
(Trypilian culture);9 this is followed by the age of the early Slavs; the
beginnings of statehood; the development of statehood and political
consolidation in the times of Kyivan Rus′; the torch is passed to the
Principality of Galicia-Volhynia; there follows the Polish-Lithuanian
era, with its separate ethnoconfessional status; the Cossack era and seventeenth-
century statehood; the Hetmanate and limited autonomy; the
decline of the Hetmanate, with compensation in the form of cultural and
territorial patriotism, as well as the “national renaissance”; the apogee
of the latter in the Revolution of 1917–21 (here the names vary, from
the wholly ideological “liberation struggle” or “national revolution”
to the more neutral “Ukrainian Revolution”). Unity is then somewhat
infringed, but not radically. Some consider the Soviet period and Soviet
Ukrainian statehood a break in continuity (successfully compensated by
the existence of a national-liberation movement in a variety of manifestations,
which, to be sure, also underwent a “metamorphosis” from one
form to another). Others think of Soviet Ukrainian statehood as an element
of continuity, as recently manifested with particular acuteness
by the peculiar jubilee (eighty-fifth birth anniversary) of Volodymyr
Shcherbytsky.10 Finally, 1991 becomes the crown of a “thousand-year
history.” This is the point at which the “non-historic” nation finally turns
into a “historical” one and history is activized in reverse—the existence
of a state in the present begins to call for something similar in the past.
A necessary element of the canon is a national historical myth, that
is, an array or system of notions about the national past and definitive
socially significant historical symbols that possess stable moral and
political value and constitute an essential normative element of national
identity. Given the preceding considerations, this myth may be assumed
to be ethnocentric by definition; once again, it displays a number of
birthmarks common to all the historical myths of formerly “non-historical”
nations that begin to assert themselves as “historical.” (Let us note
parenthetically that the corresponding myths of “historical” nations possess
the same features, the only difference being that they have already
been taken “out of the framework” of professional historiography and
18 Georgiy Kasianov
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introduced as part of “textbook” history in the schools. Indeed, given
the process of European integration, particular “exclusivist” elements
of that myth are already being eliminated in order to promote “integrationist”
components of mass consciousness. This applies particularly to
the “European character” of Ukraine, an important element of the myth
of its civilizational allegiance.) But this refashioning or reorientation of
the myth is not working, as the idea of Ukraine’s “European character”
has no resonance among much of the population of eastern and southern
Ukraine.
The mythological repertoire of nationalized Ukrainian history is a
fairly standard one for Eastern Europe: here we find the myth of the civilizational
barrier between East and West, the myth of ancient origins
(again featuring the Trypilians), the myth of “historical firsts” with regard
to major events and processes (let us mention at least the very agreeable
but groundless myth about Pylyp Orlyk as the author of the first constitution
in Europe, or exclusivist claims to the legacy of Kyivan Rus′), the
myth of distinctive Ukrainian social characteristics (especially innate
democratism), the myth of unbroken (continuous) Ukrainian settlement
within a particular habitat, and so on.
To be sure, in speaking of the Ukrainian national historical myth one
should not consider it fully formed or, most importantly, functional.
However paradoxical it may seem, this myth remains quite amorphous
despite certain distinct and stable features. The myths created in nineteenth-
century grand narratives cannot simply be reinstalled in historiography
and mass consciousness, if only because the geographic configuration
of contemporary Ukraine does not allow it. Since the ethno -
national myth is an element of exclusivist history intended to fulfill
mainly ideological functions, it is difficult to address it to and impose it
on a considerable part of the population, even within the Ukrainian ethnic
community. For instance, the Cossack myth does not have powerful
emotional resonance in the western regions of Ukraine, while the heroic
myth of the nationalist movement and the armed struggle of the Ukrainian
Insurgent Army during the Second World War, which is particularly
important in western Ukraine, is actively rejected in the east. Let us add
to this the presence and continued functioning in intellectual space of the
remains of Soviet intellectual mythology and the introduction of new,
confrontational myths associated with the struggle against that Soviet
mythology. These include the myth imported from the diaspora and then
reconstructed in Ukraine of the deliberately anti-Ukrainian “ethnocidal”
policy of the Soviet state and the powerful related thematic line of the
“Natonalized” History 19
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famines and repressive policies of the 1920s–40s. This myth (whatever
the real grounds for it that can be found in the past) also serves as a
powerful explanatory tool in current political debates and collective
memory construction: political, economic and cultural problems are
often explained as an outcome of human losses suffered by the Ukrainian
people during the Soviet period.
Mention may also be made in this context of the problem of creating
a national pantheon. It is almost impossible to establish a group of “all-
Ukrainian” figures while remaining within the canon of nationalized
history and ethnic exclusivity. Taras Shevchenko, Lesia Ukrainka and
Bohdan Khmelnytsky may, after all, be accepted by most of the population
as symbols representative of the whole society (not only because
of their “universality” but also because they belonged to the Soviet
pantheon). But the figures of Ivan Mazepa, Stepan Bandera, or even
Mykhailo Hrushevsky lack such broad appeal, not only because they
belong mainly to nationalized history, but also because of the inertia of
the selfsame Soviet mythology. Thus the inability of nationalized history
to create a fully functional “all-Ukrainian pantheon” as part of an
integrative civic mythology considerably undermines the realization of
the very task of creating an imagined civic nation.
The rhetoric of nationalized history and, generally, its discursive practice
as such deserves particular attention. Its manner of speaking, which
necessarily reveals its world view and way of thinking, gives rise to a
rather undemanding cognitive and categorical space in which breathing
is very easy—that air, which consists of almost pure oxygen with a minimum
of foreign elements, induces a euphoria of recognition and relation.
It suffices to master a few standard concepts and categories (from
“national renaissance,” “instinct for statehood” and “national wisdom”
to “the people’s state-forming potential”) that can be used to encompass
and characterize anything, any kind of “history.”
This way of speaking also highlights confrontation and drama: nationalized
history consists entirely of the nation’s struggle for survival and
its contest with internal and external enemies; it is constantly “othering”
neighbors to produce a black-and-white high-contrast world. Closely
related to this is another important feature of the linguistic practices of
nationalized history—what Mark von Hagen aptly termed “lacrimogenesis.”
Fetishizing the “long-suffering people”; emphasizing its losses (and
consciously or unconsciously exaggerating them); intensifying the emotional
stress associated with certain terrible facts and events; attempting
to explain present-day failures by invoking large-scale “genetic losses,”
20 Georgiy Kasianov
Ukrajna I:Ideologies minta 10/21/08 5:07 PM Page 20
“elite betrayals,” and “perfidious enemies”; the frequent use of invective
and adjectives such as “terrible,” “frightful,” “murderous,” “hostile,”
and “mortal”; as well as nouns like “terror,” “losses,” “treason,”
“perdition,” and so on—all these are the first and most obvious characteristics
of the classic canon of nationalized history.
No less definite a characteristic of this canon is the preponderance of
metaphors over clear and substantial scholarly definitions. The concepts
and categories with which the historian operates in this case require no
explanation: there is an informal consensus on their content and appropriateness
to the canon. In the pages of canonical works of nationalized
history the reader will find no elaborate specifications: concepts and
categories are completely self-sufficient and self-evident, nor is there any
chance of misinterpretation, for everyone writes according to the same
model. As for figurative language, it is most glaringly apparent in the
excess of anthropomorphisms. In this discourse Ukraine “wishes,” “is
able,” “suffers,” “strives,” “struggles,” “aspires,” “wins”; it is “oppressed,”
“plundered,” and “exploited.” It is a living being with its own emotions,
diseases and conflicts—and in this regard it is highly tempting to draw
parallels with the basic outlook of organic nationalism, for which the
nation is also a living entity.
Finally, it is worth mentioning the obvious overload of archaisms in
the language of this canon. The best-known example is the application
of terminology from the modern era to premodern and early modern
times and the archaization of related phenomena. Writers working in
this mode point out that in the seventeenth century Ukrainian peasants
were already nationalists; that Cossacks had already laid the foundations
of a farming economy; that Bohdan Khmelnytsky introduced a balanced
budget and created a presidential form of government; that elements of
civil society were established on those territories, and so on.11
Naturally, we are concerned first and foremost with general typical
characteristics of the method and language of nationalized history, in
which gradations from radical to moderate are entirely possible. The
point here is not to draw up a list of “mortal sins” but to take a fairly
detached view; not to make accusations of “backwardness” but to establish
facts and render a diagnosis.
Nationalized history is a perfectly legitimate intellectual product both
from the viewpoint of public demand and because of the need to “catch
up” or “fill in a gap.” Although it means falling into the sin of functionalism,
one should admit that this kind of history does indeed fulfill an
important social function associated with legitimizing the presence of a
“Natonalized” History 21
Ukrajna I:Ideologies minta 10/21/08 5:07 PM Page 21
certain nation in space and, no less important, in time. The problem is
not so much nationalized history itself, with its rather archaic cognitive
and classifying apparatus, its orientation on satisfying ideological demand,
and its intellectual hermeticism (for it is entirely self-sufficient). The
problem lies, rather, in its extensive mass self-replication, which creates
conditions uncongenial to the diversification of intellectual space and to
the establishment and existence of other versions of both nationalized
history and national histories in the framework of Ukrainian history,
to say nothing of the possibility of creating transnational histories of
Ukraine. Solving this problem is a serious intellectual challenge to
Ukrainian historians.with certain terrible facts and events; attempting
to explain present-day failures by invoking large-scale “genetic losses,”
20 Georgiy Kasianov
Ukrajna I:Ideologies minta 10/21/08 5:07 PM Page 20
“elite betrayals,” and “perfidious enemies”; the frequent use of invective
and adjectives such as “terrible,” “frightful,” “murderous,” “hostile,”
and “mortal”; as well as nouns like “terror,” “losses,” “treason,”
“perdition,” and so on—all these are the first and most obvious characteristics
of the classic canon of nationalized history.
No less definite a characteristic of this canon is the preponderance of
metaphors over clear and substantial scholarly definitions. The concepts
and categories with which the historian operates in this case require no
explanation: there is an informal consensus on their content and appropriateness
to the canon. In the pages of canonical works of nationalized
history the reader will find no elaborate specifications: concepts and
categories are completely self-sufficient and self-evident, nor is there any
chance of misinterpretation, for everyone writes according to the same
model. As for figurative language, it is most glaringly apparent in the
excess of anthropomorphisms. In this discourse Ukraine “wishes,” “is
able,” “suffers,” “strives,” “struggles,” “aspires,” “wins”; it is “oppressed,”
“plundered,” and “exploited.” It is a living being with its own emotions,
diseases and conflicts—and in this regard it is highly tempting to draw
parallels with the basic outlook of organic nationalism, for which the
nation is also a living entity.
Finally, it is worth mentioning the obvious overload of archaisms in
the language of this canon. The best-known example is the application
of terminology from the modern era to premodern and early modern
times and the archaization of related phenomena. Writers working in
this mode point out that in the seventeenth century Ukrainian peasants
were already nationalists; that Cossacks had already laid the foundations
of a farming economy; that Bohdan Khmelnytsky introduced a balanced
budget and created a presidential form of government; that elements of
civil society were established on those territories, and so on.11
Naturally, we are concerned first and foremost with general typical
characteristics of the method and language of nationalized history, in
which gradations from radical to moderate are entirely possible. The
point here is not to draw up a list of “mortal sins” but to take a fairly
detached view; not to make accusations of “backwardness” but to establish
facts and render a diagnosis.
Nationalized history is a perfectly legitimate intellectual product both
from the viewpoint of public demand and because of the need to “catch
up” or “fill in a gap.” Although it means falling into the sin of functionalism,
one should admit that this kind of history does indeed fulfill an
important social function associated with legitimizing the presence of a
“Natonalized” History 21
Ukrajna I:Ideologies minta 10/21/08 5:07 PM Page 21
certain nation in space and, no less important, in time. The problem is
not so much nationalized history itself, with its rather archaic cognitive
and classifying apparatus, its orientation on satisfying ideological demand,
and its intellectual hermeticism (for it is entirely self-sufficient). The
problem lies, rather, in its extensive mass self-replication, which creates
conditions uncongenial to the diversification of intellectual space and to
the establishment and existence of other versions of both nationalized
history and national histories in the framework of Ukrainian history,
to say nothing of the possibility of creating transnational histories of
Ukraine. Solving this problem is a serious intellectual challenge to
Ukrainian historians.
Kasianov, G., “Nationalized” History: Past Continuous, Present Perfect, Future… , in A Laboratory of Transnational History Ukraine and Recent Ukrainian Historiography, (Eds.), G. Kasianov and Phi. Ther, Budapesht, 2009.
Let us attempt to establish the basic parameters of the canonical scheme
now practiced in normative historiography with greater or lesser variations
and even occasional “deviations.” The preceding reflections may
lend themselves to a somewhat simplified notion of a canon supposedly
formulated and propagated only by ideologically committed historians
who carry out service functions for ideological structures, or by professionals
inspired by enthusiasm for patriotic enlightenment, or by those
who consider Ukrainian history a convenient and necessary didactic
instrument for implanting Ukrainian patriotism into mass consciousness.
The reality is of course far more complex. Those who pursue their
research in the framework of normative historiography include fairly
high-quality professionals who are aware of other approaches and value
them but nevertheless prefer to adhere to traditional schemas and seek
ways of adapting them to contemporary requirements or defend their
intellectual capacity (for example, the Lviv historians Yaroslav Dashkevych
and Yaroslav Isaievych).
Naturally, such attitudes may be provoked by distaste for intellectual
fashion, especially by reaction to the import of previously unknown,
misinterpreted and quite often misspelled terminology and methodology,
or by simple lack of interest, or, indeed, by personal preference. In
any case, it is unfair to depict representatives of normative historiography
as some kind of monolithic legion of professional obscurantism or
methodological backwardness.
As noted earlier, the fundamental features of the historiographic canon
took shape at the turn of the twentieth century on the basis of mixed traditions
of romanticism (the identification of the people as the basic subject
of national history per se) and positivism as the basic approach to
the subject. In historiographic jargon that line was given the name of
“populist” historiography or “the Hrushevsky school.” During the early
decades of the twentieth century this canon was supplemented in some
measure by the so-called statist school (whose founder is traditionally
considered to be Viacheslav Lypynsky), which stressed the role of elites
“Natonalized” History 15
Ukrajna I:Ideologies minta 10/21/08 5:07 PM Page 15
and the state factor in nation formation. In diaspora historiography these
two orientations were cultivated as distinct schools, although there was
no difference between them in principle—both promoted the realization
of the “national project” and did not so much contradict as supplement
each other within the framework of the national-patriotic canon. The
return to “authentic” history at the turn of the 1990s led to the reincarnation
of this approach and gave it active academic currency.
Let us attempt to define the basic features of this canon. Above all, it
is basically teleological. The goal—the formation of a nation and a
state—is identified with the cause, generating the idea that the Ukrainian
nation and state arose naturally and were “objectively determined”
or programmed. They arose because they were supposed to arise. This
kind of causality manifests itself in clear-cut cognitive schemas, deviation
from which is regarded as lack of patriotism at worst and methodological
imperfection at best. It is worth noting that the tendency to construct
linear teleological schemes within the framework of the national
narrative is determined not only by ideological demand and the legitimization
syndrome, or by a simple return to the cognitive and descriptive
schemas of the turn of the twentieth century, but also by the wholly
painless adaptation of ways of thinking and writing implanted in the
consciousness of historians during the Soviet period. The transition
from the teleology of socio-economic formations and class struggle to
the teleology of the eternal existence of the nation and its struggle for
that existence passed almost unnoticed and is unlikely to have become
an object of reflection for the great majority of those who are “restoring
historical justice.”
This kind of teleology is impossible without essentialism: the Ukrainian
nation (in its various hypostases) is defined as a constantly (actually
or potentially) present community that needs only to be properly identified
and characterized with the aid of a well-chosen set of cognitive instru -
ments. As a result, categories of ideological or political practice very
easily take on scholarly analytical status, and the distinction between
scholarship and ideology disappears, which does not, in principle, disturb
the supporters and adepts of nationalized history. The outstanding example
here is the category of “national renaissance,” which has fulfilled
various ideological functions and continues to do so, even as it remains
quite legitimately on the list of scholarly concepts. In this case, a rational
explanation of “national renaissance” is conceivable and possible,
but it inevitably remains secondary and subordinate to the metaphor—
essentially irrational but extraordinarily potent—that asserts the exis-
16 Georgiy Kasianov
Ukrajna I:Ideologies minta 10/21/08 5:07 PM Page 16
tence and presence of a transcendent, timeless “nation.” In periods of
statelessness this is a “nation in itself,” a Sleeping Beauty; when handsome
princes arrive in the persons of bearded historians, philologists,
ethnographers and others, it awakens and becomes a nation “for itself”;
a felicitous period of statehood begins, and the vexatious need to assert
its right of existence disappears. Such a worldview contains an element
of the given. It is not the nation’s existence that requires explanation but
cases in which the nation gives no sign of life (in general, or in certain
historical periods). This explanation is intended mainly for oneself. There
are also explanations for others—arguments deployed in the struggle
with those who question the eternal presence of a given nation (even as
a project) in history and in the present.
There is an element of overpowering intellectual inertia in all this.
The repetition of a scenario duplicated dozens, hundreds, and thousands
of times in political writings, textbooks, scholarly works, and fiction
creates an aura of self-evidence and naturalness in spite of its obvious
banality.
Another basic feature of the canon of nationalized history is its ethnocentricity,
which readily turns into egocentricity. Since its principal
subject is the Ukrainian people, and, according to the corresponding
intellectual tradition, the “Ukrainian people” is a particular ethnos or
group of culturally, linguistically and even genetically related ethnoses
and subethnoses, it is clear that national history is concerned above all
with the transformation of this people and ethnos into a nation. A characteristic
feature in this regard is the identification of the concept of the
“Ukrainian people” with that of the “Ukrainian nation.”
This gives rise to another important feature of nationalized history: its
claim to ethnic exclusivity. The history of Ukraine is the history of ethnic
Ukrainians. A number of approaches are possible here. The coarsest
of them consists in ignoring the presence of other ethnoses or nations in
what was actually a common space and time; the denial of a whole system
of mutual cultural, psychological, political, and economic influences;
and the refusal of the right of other nations to exist “inside” Ukrainian
nationalized history. A variant of this approach recognizes the presence
of other peoples (ethnoses) in nationalized history as a background
required to reinforce and structure the history of one’s own nation.
Mention must also be made of claims to the particularly tragic and sacrificial
character of Ukrainian history—an extreme and rather superficial
variant of exclusivity.
“Natonalized” History 17
Ukrajna I:Ideologies minta 10/21/08 5:07 PM Page 17
Finally, one of the most prominent elements of the canon is the linearity
and absolutization of the historical continuity of the “ethnospeople-
nation.” The outstanding example is the well-known “metamorphosis”
of Ukrainian history as it makes its way through various schemes
of periodization. Although this construction is well known, it is worth
considering once again in order to make the argument complete: first
we have the presence of autochthonous tribes since prehistoric times
(Trypilian culture);9 this is followed by the age of the early Slavs; the
beginnings of statehood; the development of statehood and political
consolidation in the times of Kyivan Rus′; the torch is passed to the
Principality of Galicia-Volhynia; there follows the Polish-Lithuanian
era, with its separate ethnoconfessional status; the Cossack era and seventeenth-
century statehood; the Hetmanate and limited autonomy; the
decline of the Hetmanate, with compensation in the form of cultural and
territorial patriotism, as well as the “national renaissance”; the apogee
of the latter in the Revolution of 1917–21 (here the names vary, from
the wholly ideological “liberation struggle” or “national revolution”
to the more neutral “Ukrainian Revolution”). Unity is then somewhat
infringed, but not radically. Some consider the Soviet period and Soviet
Ukrainian statehood a break in continuity (successfully compensated by
the existence of a national-liberation movement in a variety of manifestations,
which, to be sure, also underwent a “metamorphosis” from one
form to another). Others think of Soviet Ukrainian statehood as an element
of continuity, as recently manifested with particular acuteness
by the peculiar jubilee (eighty-fifth birth anniversary) of Volodymyr
Shcherbytsky.10 Finally, 1991 becomes the crown of a “thousand-year
history.” This is the point at which the “non-historic” nation finally turns
into a “historical” one and history is activized in reverse—the existence
of a state in the present begins to call for something similar in the past.
A necessary element of the canon is a national historical myth, that
is, an array or system of notions about the national past and definitive
socially significant historical symbols that possess stable moral and
political value and constitute an essential normative element of national
identity. Given the preceding considerations, this myth may be assumed
to be ethnocentric by definition; once again, it displays a number of
birthmarks common to all the historical myths of formerly “non-historical”
nations that begin to assert themselves as “historical.” (Let us note
parenthetically that the corresponding myths of “historical” nations possess
the same features, the only difference being that they have already
been taken “out of the framework” of professional historiography and
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introduced as part of “textbook” history in the schools. Indeed, given
the process of European integration, particular “exclusivist” elements
of that myth are already being eliminated in order to promote “integrationist”
components of mass consciousness. This applies particularly to
the “European character” of Ukraine, an important element of the myth
of its civilizational allegiance.) But this refashioning or reorientation of
the myth is not working, as the idea of Ukraine’s “European character”
has no resonance among much of the population of eastern and southern
Ukraine.
The mythological repertoire of nationalized Ukrainian history is a
fairly standard one for Eastern Europe: here we find the myth of the civilizational
barrier between East and West, the myth of ancient origins
(again featuring the Trypilians), the myth of “historical firsts” with regard
to major events and processes (let us mention at least the very agreeable
but groundless myth about Pylyp Orlyk as the author of the first constitution
in Europe, or exclusivist claims to the legacy of Kyivan Rus′), the
myth of distinctive Ukrainian social characteristics (especially innate
democratism), the myth of unbroken (continuous) Ukrainian settlement
within a particular habitat, and so on.
To be sure, in speaking of the Ukrainian national historical myth one
should not consider it fully formed or, most importantly, functional.
However paradoxical it may seem, this myth remains quite amorphous
despite certain distinct and stable features. The myths created in nineteenth-
century grand narratives cannot simply be reinstalled in historiography
and mass consciousness, if only because the geographic configuration
of contemporary Ukraine does not allow it. Since the ethno -
national myth is an element of exclusivist history intended to fulfill
mainly ideological functions, it is difficult to address it to and impose it
on a considerable part of the population, even within the Ukrainian ethnic
community. For instance, the Cossack myth does not have powerful
emotional resonance in the western regions of Ukraine, while the heroic
myth of the nationalist movement and the armed struggle of the Ukrainian
Insurgent Army during the Second World War, which is particularly
important in western Ukraine, is actively rejected in the east. Let us add
to this the presence and continued functioning in intellectual space of the
remains of Soviet intellectual mythology and the introduction of new,
confrontational myths associated with the struggle against that Soviet
mythology. These include the myth imported from the diaspora and then
reconstructed in Ukraine of the deliberately anti-Ukrainian “ethnocidal”
policy of the Soviet state and the powerful related thematic line of the
“Natonalized” History 19
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famines and repressive policies of the 1920s–40s. This myth (whatever
the real grounds for it that can be found in the past) also serves as a
powerful explanatory tool in current political debates and collective
memory construction: political, economic and cultural problems are
often explained as an outcome of human losses suffered by the Ukrainian
people during the Soviet period.
Mention may also be made in this context of the problem of creating
a national pantheon. It is almost impossible to establish a group of “all-
Ukrainian” figures while remaining within the canon of nationalized
history and ethnic exclusivity. Taras Shevchenko, Lesia Ukrainka and
Bohdan Khmelnytsky may, after all, be accepted by most of the population
as symbols representative of the whole society (not only because
of their “universality” but also because they belonged to the Soviet
pantheon). But the figures of Ivan Mazepa, Stepan Bandera, or even
Mykhailo Hrushevsky lack such broad appeal, not only because they
belong mainly to nationalized history, but also because of the inertia of
the selfsame Soviet mythology. Thus the inability of nationalized history
to create a fully functional “all-Ukrainian pantheon” as part of an
integrative civic mythology considerably undermines the realization of
the very task of creating an imagined civic nation.
The rhetoric of nationalized history and, generally, its discursive practice
as such deserves particular attention. Its manner of speaking, which
necessarily reveals its world view and way of thinking, gives rise to a
rather undemanding cognitive and categorical space in which breathing
is very easy—that air, which consists of almost pure oxygen with a minimum
of foreign elements, induces a euphoria of recognition and relation.
It suffices to master a few standard concepts and categories (from
“national renaissance,” “instinct for statehood” and “national wisdom”
to “the people’s state-forming potential”) that can be used to encompass
and characterize anything, any kind of “history.”
This way of speaking also highlights confrontation and drama: nationalized
history consists entirely of the nation’s struggle for survival and
its contest with internal and external enemies; it is constantly “othering”
neighbors to produce a black-and-white high-contrast world. Closely
related to this is another important feature of the linguistic practices of
nationalized history—what Mark von Hagen aptly termed “lacrimogenesis.”
Fetishizing the “long-suffering people”; emphasizing its losses (and
consciously or unconsciously exaggerating them); intensifying the emotional
stress associated with certain terrible facts and events; attempting
to explain present-day failures by invoking large-scale “genetic losses,”
20 Georgiy Kasianov
Ukrajna I:Ideologies minta 10/21/08 5:07 PM Page 20
“elite betrayals,” and “perfidious enemies”; the frequent use of invective
and adjectives such as “terrible,” “frightful,” “murderous,” “hostile,”
and “mortal”; as well as nouns like “terror,” “losses,” “treason,”
“perdition,” and so on—all these are the first and most obvious characteristics
of the classic canon of nationalized history.
No less definite a characteristic of this canon is the preponderance of
metaphors over clear and substantial scholarly definitions. The concepts
and categories with which the historian operates in this case require no
explanation: there is an informal consensus on their content and appropriateness
to the canon. In the pages of canonical works of nationalized
history the reader will find no elaborate specifications: concepts and
categories are completely self-sufficient and self-evident, nor is there any
chance of misinterpretation, for everyone writes according to the same
model. As for figurative language, it is most glaringly apparent in the
excess of anthropomorphisms. In this discourse Ukraine “wishes,” “is
able,” “suffers,” “strives,” “struggles,” “aspires,” “wins”; it is “oppressed,”
“plundered,” and “exploited.” It is a living being with its own emotions,
diseases and conflicts—and in this regard it is highly tempting to draw
parallels with the basic outlook of organic nationalism, for which the
nation is also a living entity.
Finally, it is worth mentioning the obvious overload of archaisms in
the language of this canon. The best-known example is the application
of terminology from the modern era to premodern and early modern
times and the archaization of related phenomena. Writers working in
this mode point out that in the seventeenth century Ukrainian peasants
were already nationalists; that Cossacks had already laid the foundations
of a farming economy; that Bohdan Khmelnytsky introduced a balanced
budget and created a presidential form of government; that elements of
civil society were established on those territories, and so on.11
Naturally, we are concerned first and foremost with general typical
characteristics of the method and language of nationalized history, in
which gradations from radical to moderate are entirely possible. The
point here is not to draw up a list of “mortal sins” but to take a fairly
detached view; not to make accusations of “backwardness” but to establish
facts and render a diagnosis.
Nationalized history is a perfectly legitimate intellectual product both
from the viewpoint of public demand and because of the need to “catch
up” or “fill in a gap.” Although it means falling into the sin of functionalism,
one should admit that this kind of history does indeed fulfill an
important social function associated with legitimizing the presence of a
“Natonalized” History 21
Ukrajna I:Ideologies minta 10/21/08 5:07 PM Page 21
certain nation in space and, no less important, in time. The problem is
not so much nationalized history itself, with its rather archaic cognitive
and classifying apparatus, its orientation on satisfying ideological demand,
and its intellectual hermeticism (for it is entirely self-sufficient). The
problem lies, rather, in its extensive mass self-replication, which creates
conditions uncongenial to the diversification of intellectual space and to
the establishment and existence of other versions of both nationalized
history and national histories in the framework of Ukrainian history,
to say nothing of the possibility of creating transnational histories of
Ukraine. Solving this problem is a serious intellectual challenge to
Ukrainian historians.with certain terrible facts and events; attempting
to explain present-day failures by invoking large-scale “genetic losses,”
20 Georgiy Kasianov
Ukrajna I:Ideologies minta 10/21/08 5:07 PM Page 20
“elite betrayals,” and “perfidious enemies”; the frequent use of invective
and adjectives such as “terrible,” “frightful,” “murderous,” “hostile,”
and “mortal”; as well as nouns like “terror,” “losses,” “treason,”
“perdition,” and so on—all these are the first and most obvious characteristics
of the classic canon of nationalized history.
No less definite a characteristic of this canon is the preponderance of
metaphors over clear and substantial scholarly definitions. The concepts
and categories with which the historian operates in this case require no
explanation: there is an informal consensus on their content and appropriateness
to the canon. In the pages of canonical works of nationalized
history the reader will find no elaborate specifications: concepts and
categories are completely self-sufficient and self-evident, nor is there any
chance of misinterpretation, for everyone writes according to the same
model. As for figurative language, it is most glaringly apparent in the
excess of anthropomorphisms. In this discourse Ukraine “wishes,” “is
able,” “suffers,” “strives,” “struggles,” “aspires,” “wins”; it is “oppressed,”
“plundered,” and “exploited.” It is a living being with its own emotions,
diseases and conflicts—and in this regard it is highly tempting to draw
parallels with the basic outlook of organic nationalism, for which the
nation is also a living entity.
Finally, it is worth mentioning the obvious overload of archaisms in
the language of this canon. The best-known example is the application
of terminology from the modern era to premodern and early modern
times and the archaization of related phenomena. Writers working in
this mode point out that in the seventeenth century Ukrainian peasants
were already nationalists; that Cossacks had already laid the foundations
of a farming economy; that Bohdan Khmelnytsky introduced a balanced
budget and created a presidential form of government; that elements of
civil society were established on those territories, and so on.11
Naturally, we are concerned first and foremost with general typical
characteristics of the method and language of nationalized history, in
which gradations from radical to moderate are entirely possible. The
point here is not to draw up a list of “mortal sins” but to take a fairly
detached view; not to make accusations of “backwardness” but to establish
facts and render a diagnosis.
Nationalized history is a perfectly legitimate intellectual product both
from the viewpoint of public demand and because of the need to “catch
up” or “fill in a gap.” Although it means falling into the sin of functionalism,
one should admit that this kind of history does indeed fulfill an
important social function associated with legitimizing the presence of a
“Natonalized” History 21
Ukrajna I:Ideologies minta 10/21/08 5:07 PM Page 21
certain nation in space and, no less important, in time. The problem is
not so much nationalized history itself, with its rather archaic cognitive
and classifying apparatus, its orientation on satisfying ideological demand,
and its intellectual hermeticism (for it is entirely self-sufficient). The
problem lies, rather, in its extensive mass self-replication, which creates
conditions uncongenial to the diversification of intellectual space and to
the establishment and existence of other versions of both nationalized
history and national histories in the framework of Ukrainian history,
to say nothing of the possibility of creating transnational histories of
Ukraine. Solving this problem is a serious intellectual challenge to
Ukrainian historians.
Kasianov, G., “Nationalized” History: Past Continuous, Present Perfect, Future… , in A Laboratory of Transnational History Ukraine and Recent Ukrainian Historiography, (Eds.), G. Kasianov and Phi. Ther, Budapesht, 2009.